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Comment
If You Play, You Pay: Unknown
Hazards For Successor Corporations
Under CERCLA
INTRODUCTION
In 1979, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) conducted a survey to determine the number of existing
inactive and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites' and estimated that
as many as 30,000 to 50,000 such sites existed.2 Of those existing
sites, between 1,200 and 2,000 were determined to present serious
risks to public health.3 Further, the EPA estimated that only ten
percent of the 77.1 billion pounds of hazardous waste produced
1. See H.R. RnP. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6120 (the EPA survey is referred to within the House Report);
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (Supp. 1991) (defining hazardous substance by reference to substances
designated as hazardous or toxic under the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6921, the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412, any substance designated pursuant to 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(2)(A), any
element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 9602, any
toxic pollutant listed under 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317(a), or any imminently hazardous chemical substance
or mixture upon which the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has taken
action pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 2606). Hazardous substances do not include petroleum, crude oil,
natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel. 42 U.S.C.A. §
9601(14) (Supp. 1991).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 510, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6120 (discussing the EPA survey).
3. Id.
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each year was disposed of in an environmentally sound manner.4
The remaining 90 percent resulted in the creation of hazardous
waste sites. Between 1977 and 1980, during the 95th and 96th
Congresses, the Oversight Subcommittee of the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce identified four characteristics
which were common among most hazardous waste sites: (1)
Hazardous waste was found in large quantities; (2) unsafe design
and disposal methods were widespread; (3) the danger to the
environment was substantial; and (4) major health hazards existed.5
In the wake of such findings, Congress was forced to take a
critical look at existing laws concerning the management of
hazardous waste.5 Recognizing the inadequacies of existing
remedial measures dealing with improperly, negligently, and
recklessly managed disposal sites, Congress passed the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).7 CERCLA authorizes the federal
government to respond8 to the release9 or threat of a release of
hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants"0 into the
environment' which pose a substantial danger to the public health
and welfare.12 Government responses can be either remedial
actions, 3 which generally includes long-term or permanent
4. Id. at 21, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 6124.
5. Id. at 18-19, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws at 6120-22.
6. Id. at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 6120.
7. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (amended by the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization
Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499 (1986)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
See generally, Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. . ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
8. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(25) (Supp. 1991) (definition of respond).
9. See idU § 9601(22) (Supp. 1991) (defining release as any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching or disposing into the
environment).
10. See id. § 9601(33) (Supp. 1991) (defining pollutant or contaminant as any element,
compound or mixture which may be reasonably anticipated to cause death, disease, behavioral
abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutation, physiological malfunctions or physical deformities after
release into the environment).
11. See id. § 9601(8) (Supp. 1991) (definition of environment).
12. Id. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. 1991).
13. See id. § 9601(24) (Supp. 1991) (definition of remedial action).
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containment or disposal programs, or removal efforts designed for
short-term cleanup. 4
Congress, however, clearly did not intend to leave clean up
under CERCLA solely in the hands of the f&eral government. 5
Congress intended that the entities which played a specific role in
the production or continuation of the hazardous condition bear the
burden of cleaning up hazardous waste sites unless such parties
lack the wherewithal to meet their obligations.' 6 Thus, Congress
created the Superfund to cover clean-up costs only where the site
has been abandoned, the responsible parties cannot be found, or
private resources are inadequate.' 7 The Superfund provides
resources for the federal government to clean up unsafe hazardous
waste sites through excise taxes on certain chemicals"2 and
petroleum products.' 9 CERCLA, instead of being a merely
regulatory standard-setting statute, allows the EPA, with the
authorization of the President, to require the Attorney General of
the United States to secure any relief necessary to abate danger or
threat of danger of a hazardous substances release.2"
Although it is clear that Congress intended that CERCLA be
remedial in nature, comprehensive legislative history regarding
14. Id. §§ 9604, 9605, 9607, 9611 (Supp. 1991). See id. §§ 9604 (Supp. 1991) (stating that
response includes removal and remedial actions taken by the President); 9605 (Supp. 1991) (setting
forth the National Contingency Plan which governs cleanup efforts through procedures and standards
for responding to releases of hazardous substances); 9607 (Supp. 1991) (allowing the EPA to sue for
reimbursement of cleanup costs from any responsible parties it can locate); 9611 (Supp. 1991) (use
of the Superfund to cleanup hazardous waste sites and spills). See also id. § 9601(23) (Supp. 1991)
(definition of removal efforts).
15. See State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2nd Cir. 1985).
16. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86,92 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(discussing the Superfund notion).
17. See Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1041 (discussing the Superfund notion).
18. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4661(a) (1989).
19. Id. at § 4611(a) (Supp. 1991).
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(a) (1983). The district court of the United States in the district in
which the threat occurs has jurisdiction to grant the relief that is justified by the public interest and
equities of the case. Id. The President may also take any other action necessary to protect the
environment and the public health and welfare. Id. Any person who willfully violates or fails or
refuses to comply with any order of the President may be fined up to $25,000 for each day in which
the violation occurs. Id. § 9606(b)(1) (Supp. 1991). Any person who receives and complies with the
terms of any order may petition the President, within 60 days, for reimbursement from the Fund for
the reasonable costs of the action, plus interest. Id. § 9606(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991).
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CERCLA is greatly lacking.21 One court has commented that
CERCLA's history reveals as much about the nature of the
legislative process as about the nature of the legislation.22 The
version of CERCLA which was passed by Congress and signed
into law was an eleventh hour compromise which was developed
primarily by Senate leaders and sponsors of an early Senate version
of CERCLA.23 As a result of the haste to pass the CERCLA
legislation, the Act does not expressly address several major and
important issues. One prominent example is that neither the
language, nor the legislative history of CERCLA addresses the
issue of successor corporation liability.24
Due to the many unanswered questions, CERCLA has been the
subject of significant litigation in the years since its passage. This
comment will address the applicability of successor liability
doctrines under the CERCLA statute, an issue of significant
litigation in recent years. Part I of this comment will discuss the
traditional background of successor liability.' Part II will then
consider the modem successor liability doctrines, including the
"product-line rule" and the "continuing business enterprise
rule." 26 Part I will look at the application of successor liability
under CERCLA and recent judicial decisions in this area.27 Part
IV of this comment will address the legal ramifications of the
recent judicial decisions applying different successor -liability
rules.2" Finally, this comment will advocate future Congressional
21. See Comment, Environmental Law-CERCLA Liability-The Doctrine of Corporate
Successor Liability is Appropriate in Contribution Claims Under CERCLA, But Caveat Emptor is not
Available as a Defense to the Seller of Property in an Action Seeking Contribution for Clean-Up
Costs, 20 RuTGERs W. 823 (1989).
22. See Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1039. In 1980, while the Senate was considering one
version of CERCLA, the House considered and passed another. Id.
23. Id. at 1040. No committee reports concerning the compromise accompany the Act. Id.
24. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9657 (1983 & Supp. 1991) (setting forth the CERCLA
provisions).
25. See infra notes 30-49 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 50-132 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 133-207 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 208-226 and accompanying text.
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actions which should be taken to clarify the issue of successor
liability under CERCLA 9
I. TRADrnONAL RULES OF SUCCESSOR LLABILITY
The primary goal of the common law governing successor
liability was to protect the rights of commercial creditors and to
ascertain the successor corporation's liabilities for taxes and
contractual obligations of its predecessor." Successor liability
rules were meant, in large part, to protect a bona fide purchaser
from unexpected and unfair liabilities for the debts of its
predecessor.3" Under traditional rules of successor liability, where
one company sells or otherwise transfers all its assets to another,
the latter is not responsible for the liabilities of the seller unless
one of four common law exceptions applies. 2
The first of these exceptions exists when the purchasing
corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the liabilities
of the selling corporation." The second exception exists when the
sale of a corporation is equivalent to a "de facto" consolidation or
merger.3 4 A "de facto" merger requires a continuation of the
29. See infra notes 227-234 and accompanying text.
30. Comment, EPA's Policy of Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 6 STAN.
ENVTL LJ. 78,86 (1986-87) (citing Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293,303,376 N.W.2d
820, 825 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1985); NJ. Trans. Dep't. v. P.S.C. Resources, Inc., 175 NJ. Super. 447,456,
419 A.2d 1151, 1156 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1980)).
31. Id. (citing Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 1981); Downtowner,
Inc. v. Acrometal Prod., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. Sup. CL 1984)).
32. See, e.g., 15 W. FLETCHER, CYcLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122
(rev. ed. 1983); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. and L-Bar Products, Inc., v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260,
1263 (9th Cir. 1990); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1980); Ray v. Alad Corp.,
19 Cal. 3d 22,28,560 P.2d 3,7, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574,578 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397
Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 n.3 (1976).
33. See, e.g., 15 W. FLErCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122
(rev. ed. 1983); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. and L-Bar Products, Inc., v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260,
1263 (9th Cir. 1990); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1980); Ray v. Alad Corp.,
19 Cal. 3d 22,28,560 P.2d 3,7, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574,578 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397
Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 n.3 (1976).
34. See, e.g., 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122
(rev. ed. 1983); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. and L-Bar Products, Inc., v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260,
1263 (9th Cir. 1990); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1980); Ray v. Alad Corp.,
19 Cal. 3d 22,28,560 P.2d 3,7, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574,578 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397
Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 n.3 (1976).
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enterprise of the selling corporation, a continuation of shareholders
which results when the purchasing corporation pays for the
acquired assets with shares of its own stock, the selling corporation
ceases ordinary business operations as soon as legally and
practically possible, and the purchasing corporation assumes those
liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations of the
seller.
35
The third exception exists where there is a continuation of
directors and management, shareholder interest, and, in some cases,
inadequate consideration paid by the successor corporation.36 This
exception has been termed the "mere continuation exception."
Under California case law, a corporation acquiring the assets of
another corporation is liable as a "mere continuation" where no
adequate consideration was given for the predecessor corporation's
creditors or one or more persons were officers, directors, or
stockholders of both corporations.37
Finally, the fourth exception occurs where the transaction is
fraudulent as to creditors of the transferor.38 Fraud may occur, for
example, where inadequate consideration is paid to the transferor,
or where there is a lack of good faith surrounding the
transaction.39
Both the de facto merger exception and the mere continuity
exception rest upon the theory that the shareholders of the first
35. See Polius v. Clark Equipment Co., 802 F.2d 75, 85-86 (3rd Cir. 1986). This exception
was applied in Knapp v. North American Rockwell, 506 F.2d 361 (3rd Cit. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 965 (1975), to provide relief to a tort victim who could no longer sue the manufacturer because
it had dissolved and liquidated after the sale of its assets. Knapp, 506 F.2d 367-70.
36. See Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570,578 n. 3 (10th Cit. 1989) (citing L.R. FUMER,
M.I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABInzrr, §§ 2.06[2][c], 2-182,2-183 (1988)) (stating that the gravamen
of the traditional 'mere continuation' exception is the continuation of the corporate entity rather than
continuation of the business operation).
37. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 29, 560 P.2d 3, 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 578 (1977).
38. See, e.g., Knapp, 506 F.2d at 364; Louisiana-Pacific Corp. and L-Bar Products Inc., v.
Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cit. 1990); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir.
1990); Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 28, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578; Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co.,
397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 (1976).
39. See Comment, supra note 30, at 85 (enunciating that the successor is liable for the debts
of the successor corporation if the sale is not a bona ide sale for valuable consideration and is not
in the usual course of business).
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company become shareholders of the second corporation, and a
sufficient nexus exists between the successor and predecessor
corporations to establish successor liability.4" However, it is
illogical that the successor corporation in a transaction which is
structured as a merger or a de facto merger be burdened with
liability, while the successor in a cash acquisition of corporate
assets is free from such liability.4 If there are no real business
reasons for choosing a cash acquisition of corporate assets, then the
only real reason may be to avoid product liability suits.42 Because
corporations may seek to structure transactions as cash acquisitions
to avoid liability that would be incurred if the transaction were
structured as a merger or de facto merger, the rules of corporate
law may work to accomplish a purpose which is not in the public
interest.43 These corporate rules work contrary to public interest
by encouraging corporations to structure transactions which will
allow the corporations to preclude recovery by injured persons.'
In order for the party which is responsible for the injury to bear the
costs of causing the injury, the courts have developed two more
modem rules of corporate successor liability.4"
Recently, there has been a trend towards recognizing two
additional and more expansive successor liability rules: (1) The
"product-line" rule46  and (2) the "continuing business
enterprise" rule.47 These two modem rules were developed in the
context of tort cases largely for policy reasons. Although traditional
successor liability rules protect the rights of commercial creditors
and bona fide purchasers, the purpose behind traditional strict tort




44. See id. (stating that the law is unreasonably geared towards accomplishing a purpose not
intended for it or in the public interest).
45. See infra notes 53-90 and accompanying text (discussing the "product-line" rule) and
notes 91-132 and accompanying text (discussing the "continuing business enterprise" rule).
46. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). The
"'product-line rule" was formulated and first discussed in Ray.
47. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (establishing the continuing
business enterprise rule); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976)
(further defining the continuing business enterprise rule).
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liability was to protect otherwise defenseless victims and to spread
the costs of compensating them throughout society.48 In light of
this tort liability theory, the modem successor liability rules were
formulated to compensate the victim where the plaintiff had no
viable remedy against the manufacturer, and where the defendant
successor corporation had an opportunity to evaluate the risks of
production and the ability to pass on the cost of meeting those
riSks.
49
II. MODERN SUCCESSOR LIABILTY RULES
The modem "product-line" rule provides that a successor may
be liable when it continues to market the product line of the
predecessor that caused the harm.5" The "continuing business
enterprise" rule, on the other hand, is generally considered an
expanded version of the common law mere continuation
doctrine,5 where the successor corporation may be liable when
the business operation is carried over by the successor
corporation.52
48. See Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 30,560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (citing Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,27 Cal. Rptr. 697,701) (stating that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products should be borne by the manufacturers that put the
defective products on the market instead of by the injured people who are powerless to protect
themselves).
49. Id.
50. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 34, 560 P.2d 3, 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 582
(holding that a party which acquires a manufacturing business and continues to produce the same line
of products assumes strict tort liability for defects in goods manufactured and distributed by the
original manufacturer).
51. See Louisiana-Pacific Corporation, and L-Bar Products, Inc. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d
1260, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that the expanded version of the mere continuation exception is
known as the continuing business enterprise exception).
52. See Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 578 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the
gravamen of the traditional mere continuation exception is the continuation of the corporate entity
rather than continuation of the business operation).
1324
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A. Product-line Rule
The first derivation from the traditional rule of successor
liability appeared in the 1977 case of Ray v. Alad Corp.53 where
the court announced the creation of the "product-line" rule. In
Ray, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant, Alad Corporation II,
was strictly liable for damages incurred when the plaintiff fell from
a defective ladder manufactured by Alad H's predecessor.54 Prior
to the plaintiff's injury, the defendant corporation acquired the
business of the ladder's manufacturer, Alad I, through a purchase
of Alad I's assets.55 Alad II neither manufactured nor sold the
defective ladder that proximately caused plaintiff's injury.
However, there was no outward indication of any change in the
ownership of the business to either the creditors or customers.56
Alad II continued to utilize Alad I's plant, inventory,
equipment, trade name and good will in the manufacture of the
same line of ladders under the "Alad" name.57 Moreover, Alad
II continued to use the same equipment, designs, personnel, and
sales representatives as did Alad 1.58 Contract provisions for the
sale of assets by Alad I to Alad II provided that Lightning
Maintenance Corporation (Lightning),59 Alad H's predecessor,
would accept and pay for materials previously ordered by Alad I,
that Lightning would fill uncompleted orders taken by Alad I, and
that Lighting would hold Alad I harmless for any damages or
liability resulting from failure to do so.6*
53. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
54. Id. at 24, 560 P.2d at 4-5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 575-76.
55. Id. at 26,560 P.2d at 5-6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77. On July 1, 1968, Alad I sold its stock
in trade, fixtures, equipment, trade name, inventory and goodwill, as well as its interest in the real
property used to manufacture ladders to Lightning Maintenance Corporation. Id. As part of the sale
transaction, Alad I agreed to dissolve its corporate existence and to assist Lightning Maintenance
Corporation in organizing a new corporation under the name of *Alad Corporation." Id.
56. Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
57. Id. at 24-25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
58. Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
59. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining that Lightning entered into the sale
agreement with Alad I, and later formed a new entity known as "Alad Corporation" (Alad II)).
60. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 26, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
1325
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It was undisputed at trial that the ladder involved in the
accident was manufactured by Alad I and not Alad IH.6 The
defendant, Alad II, moved for summary judgment, raising the issue
as to whether there was any factual basis for imposing liability
upon Alad 11 as successor to Alad I's manufacturing business.62
After the trial court entered summary judgment for Alad II, the
plaintiff appealed to the California Supreme Court.
63
The California Supreme Court recognized that none of the four
traditional exceptions to successor non-liability was presented.
64
Specifically, neither an express nor implied agreement to assume
liability for injury from defective products manufactured by Alad
I existed.65  Second, there was neither any indication nor
contention that the transaction between Alad I and Alad II was
made for the fraudulent purpose of escaping liability for Alad I's
debts.66 Third, the court found that the purchase of Alad I's assets
did not constitute a merger or a consolidation because the
consideration paid was not inadequate.67 Fourth, the court held
that Alad II was not a mere continuation of Alad I because no
person was an officer, director or stockholder of both Alad I and
Alad ]1.68 Therefore, under traditional rules of successor non-
liability, a reviewing court would be required to affirm the lower
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.69
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court held that a party which
acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its
line of products, assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of
61. Id. at 26, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
64. Id. at 28, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying
text (discussing the common law exceptions to successor corporation nonliability).
65. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 28, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
66. Id.
67. The sole consideration given for Alad I's assets was cash in excess of $207,000. Id. at 29,
560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578. Seventy thousand dollars of this amount was paid when the
assets were transferred and a promissory note for nearly $114,000 was issued to Alad 1. Id.
68. Id See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (explaining the "mere continuation"
exception to the traditional rule of successor non-liability).
69. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 28, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
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the same product line previously manufactured and distributed by
the entity from which the business was acquired.7"
In reaching this somewhat unexpected conclusion, the court
considered whether a special departure from those rules was called
for by the policies underlying strict liability for defective
products. 71 The court noted the approach taken in Howard
Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board Hotel &
Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union, AFL-
C1072 where the United States Supreme Court gave substantial
weight to the general rules of state law governing succession to the
liabilities of an acquired going business,73 but then refused to be
bound by those rules when their application would unduly obstruct
the public policies underlying the applicable labor law.74
Following the decision in Howard Johnson, the California Supreme
Court in Ray recognized that it was necessary to decide whether
the policies underlying strict tort liability for defective products
called for a special exception to the rule that would normally
insulate Alad II, as a successor, from plaintiff's claim.75
The California Supreme Court interpreted the function of strict
liability as insuring that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products be borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves. 76 The court announced that the
justification for imposing strict liability upon the successor of a
manufacturer under the circumstances of this case rested upon three
conditions.17 The first condition was the destruction of the
70. Id. at 34, 560 P. 2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
71. Id. at 30, 560 P. 2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
72. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
73. Id. at 257. See supra notes 30-49 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional rules
of successor liability which were accepted and followed by California).
74. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 30, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
75. Id. (citing Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W. 2d 873, 877-78
(1976)).
76. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 30, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963)) (citing
the reasons behind imposing strict liability on the manufacturer).
77. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80.
1327
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plaintiff's remedies against the original manufacturer. 8 Second,
the court recognized the successor's ability to assume the original
manufacturer's risk-spreading role.79 Finally, the fairness of
requiring the successor to assume responsibility for the defective
products dictated that the successor be held strictly liable.8"
The Ray court reasoned that Alad II had substantially the same
capacity as Alad I to estimate the risks of claims for injuries
stemming from defective ladders.8 Furthermore, Alad II had the
opportunity to pass on to purchasers of new Alad products the
costs of meeting these risks. 2 Immediately upon the purchase of
Alad I's assets by Alad I, Alad I was in a position to spread the
cost of compensating otherwise defenseless victims of
manufacturing defects throughout society because Alad II increased
the prices of its products.8 3 The court also found that the
imposition of liability upon Alad II for injuries caused by Alad I's
defective products was fair and equitable in light of Alad II's
acquisition of Alad I's trade name, good will and customer lists, its
continuation of production of the same ladders, and its holding
itself out as the same enterprise.84  Because Alad II had
acquired a manufacturing business and had continued the output of
its line of products, Alad II essentially assumed strict tort liability
for defects in units of the same product line.85 By taking over and
continuing the established business of producing and distributing
Alad ladders, Alad II became an integral part of the overall
production and manufacturing, and should therefore bear the cost




81. Id. at 33, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245,251,466 P.2d 722,725-26, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178, 181-82 (1970)); Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 372-73 (3rd Cir.
1974) (concurring opinion)) (providing that the paramount policy of the strict products liability rule
is spreading costs throughout society).
84. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
85. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
86. Id.
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applied its newly formulated "product-line" rule to find liability
where previously there was none.
It has been noted that under the product-line theory, a successor
that continues to manufacture the same type of articles as its
predecessor, under the same name, with no outward indication of
any change of ownership of the business, becomes liable for
defects in units of the same product line manufactured by the
predecessor.87 Hence, the product line exception imposes liability
where traditional law does not.8 Liability is based upon the
premises that the successor corporation is in a position to assume
the risk-spreading role assigned to the manufacturer by strict
liability theories and that principles of fairness require that a
corporation which exploits the goodwill attached to a predecessor's
product also bear the burdens attached to the product.89 In
contrast, instead of imposing liability where traditionally there was
none, the countervailing modem successor liability exception--the
continuing business enterprise rule--is recognized as an alternative
which is simply an extension of the traditional rules.'
B. The Continuing Business Enterprise Rule
While both the "product-line" and "continuing business
enterprise" rules require the continuity of the predecessor's product
line, it is the "continuing business enterprise" rule which is
viewed as a less radical departure from traditional common law
exceptions. 9 Rather than making the existence of a single
corporation and identity of stock, stockholders and officers
determinative, the "continuing business enterprise" rule considers
several other factors.92  Under the "continuing business





92. Id. The continuing business enterprise rule was developed in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc.,
501 F.2d 1145 (lst Cir. 1974), and Turnerv. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d
873 (1976). See infra notes 103-128 and accompanying text (discussing Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc.
and Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co.).
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enterprise" rule,93 courts must weigh a number of factors in
determining whether to impose successor liability. 94 Among the
factors considered are whether the successor: (1) Hires the same
employees; (2) employs the same supervisory personnel; (3) retains
the same production facilities in the same location; (4) continues
producing the same products; (5) keeps the same name; (6)
maintains continuity of assets; (7) continues the same general
business operations; and (8) holds itself out to the public as the
continuation of the previous corporation.95 The traditional
"mere continuation" exception significantly differs from the
"continuing business enterprise" rule.96 A mere continuation or
reorganization exists where there is a continuation of directors,
management, shareholder interest, and in some cases, inadequate
consideration.97 The continuing business enterprise exception, on
the other hand, focuses on the continuation of the corporate entity
rather than continuation of the business operation.9" The
continuation of such a business entity was found in Cyr v. B. Offen
& Co., Inc.99 where there was an arm's-length sale of a business
and goodwill with no continuation of shareholder interest. 1°° The
successor assumed the predecessor's service obligations and
contracts, there was no notice to the public of an ownership
change, and the successor held itself out as on ongoing
enterprise.0 1 The First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
if the same group of employees continue, without pause, to produce
the same products in the same plant, with the same supervision, in
an entity which maintains essentially the same name, the fact that
the ownership of the entity may or may not have changed cannot
93. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining that the continuing enterprise rule
is al expansion of the mere continuation doctrine of traditional successor liability).
94. United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637, 642 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
95. Monzingo, 752 F.2d at 175.
96. Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 578 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989).
97. Id.
98. Florom, 867 F.2d at 578 n. 3 (citing L.R. FUMER, M.I FRiEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY,
§§ 2.0612][c, 2-182, 2-183 (1988)). See supra notes 36-37.
99. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
100. Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1151-53.
101. Id.
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be the sole determinant of liability.'02 Essentially, the court held
that in these circumstances, the successor will be held liable for the
acts of its predecessor because they continued the business
operation.
The Michigan Supreme Court, in Turner v. Bituminous Cas.
Co. °3 further developed the "continuing business enterprise"
exception by adding to the factors used in the traditional de facto
merger exception."t 4 In Turner, a products liability suit was
brought to recover for injuries caused by an allegedly defective
power press against the successor of a corporate manufacturer
which produced the press."0 5 Charles Turner, the plaintiff, was
injured by a power press while working at the Seaman
Manufacturing Company, and, as a result, both of his hands had to
be amputated.' Prior to the accident, the manufacturer of the
press, T.W. & C.B. Sheridan Company (Old Sheridan), executed a
purchase agreement whereby Harris-Intertype Corporation (Harris)
was to purchase the entire business, good will, name and assets of
the Sheridan Company.0 7 Old Sheridan filed a certificate
changing its name to Nadirehs, and incorporators acting on behalf
of Harris filed a certificate of incorporation under the name T.W.
& C.B. Sheridan Company (New Sheridan).' Subsequently,
Harris designated New Sheridan as its subsidiary to acquire the
assets of Old Sheridan.'09 Four days later, Harris paid $6.38
million to Old Sheridan in a sale of corporate assets for cash, and
distributed the newly acquired assets to the shareholders of
Harris."" Concurrently, Old Sheridan was dissolved."' The
lower appellate court held that Harris and New Sheridan were not
responsible for a product which they did not manufacture, sell or
102. Id. at 1154.
103. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
104. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 879-84.





110. Id. at 876.
111. Id.
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distribute, and for which they neither in fact nor by law assumed
legal liability.112 The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to
appeal following a denial of leave by the Court of Appeals.
113
Despite the holding of the lower court, the Michigan Supreme
Court expanded the traditional exceptions of successor liability to
increase a successor's financial vulnerability in products liability
cases."' The court noted that the lawsuit was, first and foremost,
a products liability case." 5 At the time that this case was
decided, 1976, the law of products liability was quickly developing,
and all the rules had not yet been formulated. 116 To allow this
development to continue, various impediments associated with
traditional problems were found to be inappropriate for the area of
products liability." 7
The Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that reliance on the
traditional rules of successor liability, whereby a purchasing
corporation was not liable for obligations of the transferor
corporation, was inapposite." 8 The rule of successor non-liability
absent an exception was developed largely in the areas of creditors'
protection, tax assessments, de facto mergers and shareholder
rights, and it was therefore necessary to develop a separate rule for
products liability cases occurring after corporate transfers.119
It was clear to the court that if the transaction had been a
merger or a de facto merger, rather than a sale of corporate assets
for cash, the successor corporation would have been liable for the
defective products sold by the predecessor under the common law
exception. 20 The defendant successor corporation contended that,
to avoid crippling the market, it was necessary to insulate cash




115. Id. at 877.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 877-78.
119. Id. at 878.
120. Id. at 882-83. See supra notes 30-49 and accompanying text (explaining successor liability
as the result of a merger or de facto merger).
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successor liability for defective products.' The court, however,
found this argument unpersuasive where there was an existing,
thriving market in corporate mergers and where the possibility of
such liability was already established through the traditional
exceptions. 22 The court also rejected the argument of surprise,
noting that once corporations considering a sale of assets for cash
become aware of the possibility of successor products liability, they
can make suitable preparations."
From these findings, the court concluded that in the sale of
corporate assets for cash, the courts should consider three criteria
as guidelines to establish whether there is continuity between the
transferee and the transferor corporations.' First, the court
looked at whether there is a continuation of the enterprise of the
seller corporation so that there is a continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets, and general business
operations.'2 Second, the court focused on whether the seller
corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and
dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible. 26 Third, the
court analyzes whether the purchasing corporation assumes the
liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations of the
seller corporation. 127 If continuity is established under these
guidelines, then the transferee must accept the liability with the
benefits under the guise of the continuing business enterprise
rule.
28
Although neither the product-line rule nor the continuing
enterprise rule was developed in response to CERCLA liability,
121. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 882-83.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 883. These preparations can take the form of products liability insurance,
indemnification agreements, escrow accounts, or a reduction in the purchase price. Id.
124. Id. These criteria are three of the four requirements of a de facto merger. Id.
125. Id. at 879 (citing Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974)
and McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., Div. of Harris-Intertype Corp., 109 NJ. Super. 555,264 A.2d 98,
103-105 (1970), aft'd, 118 NJ. Super. 480,288 A.2d 585 (1972)) (setting forth the four requirements
of a de facto merger).
126. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 879.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 883-84.
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both rules have been considered under CERCLA to fill the
legislative gap regarding successor liability.12 9 No court has, as
of this time, applied the product-line test in the CERCLA context,
although it has been recognized as a viable test for CERCLA
liability in those states which have accepted the rule.13 The
Ninth Circuit has recently considered the application of the
continuing enterprise rule to a CERCLA liability case,131 and at
least one U.S. District Court has affinatively applied this rule to
impose liability upon a successor corporation in the CERCLA
context. 132
III. SUCCESSOR LIAB UNDER CERCLA
Currently, there does not appear to be a uniform approach to
determining which successor liability rules apply to CERCLA
cases.'33 Further, some circuits have declined to accept the
"product-line" or "continuing business enterprise" rules as viable
129. See supra notes 53-90 and accompanying text (explaining the "product line rule") and
supra notes 90-128 and accompanying text (explaining the "continuing enterprise rule").
130. See, e.g., United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 902, 904 (W.D.
Wash 1990). See also infra notes 138-185 and accompanying text (discussing the product-line rule
as applied in a CERCLA context).
131. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)1450 (1989), aff'd
909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990); infra notes 144-185 and accompanying text (discussing the
applicability of the continuing business enterprise rule to CERCLA in the Ninth Circuit).
132. See United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990); infra notes 144-207 and
accompanying text (discussing the application of the continuing business enterprise rule in a
CERCLA context).
133. See, e.g., Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(ruling that the general doctrine of corporate successor liability is appropriate in CERCLA
contribution cases); Standard Equipment, Inc. v. The Boeing Co., No. C84-1129D, slip op. (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 20, 1987) (holding that Washington will not apply the product-line rule in CERCLA
cases); Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1262, 1265-66 (providing that Congress intended successor
liability under CERCLA, and the continuing business enterprise rule was not applicable to facts);
Louisiana-Pacific, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1450, 1452 (noting that the product-line rule was not
argued in that case); Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 643 (stating that the continuing business enterprise rule
is applicable in CERCLA context); United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 902,
904 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (holding that both the product-line rule and continuing business enterprise
rule are viable under CERCLA).
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theories of successor liability in any context.1 4 Of the circuits
which accept the newer successor liability rules, one court has
simply stated that both tests are viable in the CERCLA
context,3 5 and another court has stated that although the
"product-line" and "continuing business enterprise" rules are
applicable under CERCLA, they are not needed to impose liability
on a successor corporation in the context of CERCLA. 136 Still
other courts have directly applied the "continuing business
enterprise" exception when confronted with successor liability in
CERCLA cases.
137
A. The Product-line Rule in CERCLA Cases
In the 1990 case of United States v. Western Processing Co.,
Inc.,138 the United States District Court in Washington considered
the applicability of both the product-line and continuing business
enterprise rules to a CERCLA case. 139 In denying Western
Processing Co., Inc.'s motion for partial summary judgment on the
issue of successor liability, the District Court recognized that the
supporting materials submitted by The Boeing Company, a third
party plaintiff, indicated a substantial continuation of the previous
business sufficient to impose successor liability in the CERCLA
contribution action.'
The District Court noted that there is support for, and public
interest in, an expansive interpretation of successor liability in
134. See, e.g., Polius v. Clark Equipment Co., 802 F.2d 75, 83 (3rd Cir. 1986) (stating that the
product-line and continuing business exceptions focus exclusively on the needs of the products
liability plaintiff and encourage courts to overlook the equally valid arguments of the business world,
and the law of successor liability should therefore only be changed by legislation, and not by judicial
fiat).
135. United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 902,904 (W.D. Wash 1990).
136. Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991). The universal
rule is that "corporation" includes a successor corporation and the drafters of CERCLA intended that
*corporation" be given its usual meaning. Id. at 1245.
137. See Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 642-43 (providing that the reasons supporting the application
of the "continuing business enterprise" exception in products liability cases are equally applicable
in the context of CERCLA and finding the successor corporation liable under that exception).
138. 751 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Wash 1990).
139. Id. at 904.
140. Id.
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CERCLA actions.141 Since CERCLA intends that clean-up costs
be shared by responsible parties, a more expansive view of
successor liability will foster a more equitable sharing of
remediation costs under CERCLA." As such, the court
concluded that both the product-line and continuing business
enterprise tests are viable in the CERCLA context and declined to
reject them.'
B. The Continuing Business Enterprise Rule in CERCLA Cases
1. The Continuing Business Enterprise Rule in the Ninth
Circuit
On July 3, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decided the case of Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco
Inc."' In that case, the Ninth Circuit expressly considered the
issue of successor liability under CERCLA"4 ' and affirmed the
district court's conclusion that the successor corporation was not
liable under the continuing business enterprise exception to
successor liability.'46
In Louisiana-Pacific, Industrial Mineral Products, Inc. (IMP)
was a Washington corporation which processed and marketed
smelter slag4 7 from a copper mill operated by Asarco for
approximately 80 years.148 In March of 1985, the copper smelter
operated by Asarco ceased operations, and in January 1986, L-Bar
141. Id. at 905.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 904. The court also noted that the Ninth Circuit did not reject these exceptions in
Louisiana-Pacific Corp., v. Asarco Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990) but merely declined to decide
those issues in that case. United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 902, 905 W.
D. Wash. 1990). See infra notes 144-162 and accompanying text (discussing Loulsiana-Pacifc).
144. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
145. id.
146. Id. at 1265-66.
147. Smelter slag is a hard rock-like by-product used as a ballast to stabilize the ground at log
sort yards. Id. at 1262.
148. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco Inc., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1450, 1451 (1989),
affid 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
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entered into a purchase agreement with IMP. 149 L-Bar purchased
substantially all of IMP's assets, and hired many of IMP's officers
and employees.
150
L-Bar's payment of $4.5 million included cash, a note, and an
assumption of IiP's debts. 5' L-Bar did not, however, reinstate
IMP's slag business, never used the equipment at Asarco, and did
not purchase IMP's stock or name.' 52 The specific terms of the
purchase agreement stated that IMP would indemnify L-Bar against
any and all claims arising out of the environmental impact of
IMP's operations.'53
IMP sold the slag to several businesses, including Louisiana-
Pacific (LP), from the early 1970's until March 1985.154 LP
deposited the slag into the ground of their log yards in order to
stabilize that ground.' 5 Government agencies now claim that the
particular slag used by LP reacted with the acidic wood-waste,
causing heavy metals from the slag to penetrate the soil and
contaminate the groundwater. 156 As a result, LP's log yards
require substantial environmental clean up.'
57
Louisiana-Pacific and the Port of Tacoma sued Asarco under
CERCLA, asserting that Asarco was liable for the costs of cleaning
149. Id.




153. Id. Section 11.1 of the purchase agreement provided:
11.1 Indemnification by Seller. Effective as of the closing date, seller shall indemnify and
hold harmless buyer from and against any and all claims, damages, or liabilities (whether
or not caused by negligence), including civil or criminal fines, arising out of or relating
to any of the following:...
(c) any generation, processing, handling, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of
solid wastes or hazardous wastes by seller including, but not limited to, any of such
activities occurring on any of the assets;
(d) any releases by seller (including, but not limited to, any releases as defined under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980) to the
extent occurring or existing prior to closing, including, but not limited to, such releases
to land, water (surface waters or ground waters), or into the air ....
Id.
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up and preventing the release of hazardous substances into the
groundwater and soil.158 Asarco named L-Bar as a third-party
defendant, seeking contribution or indemnity for clean-up costs in
the event it should be found liable. I"9 The lower court granted
summary judgement for L-Bar and dismissed Asarco's claims
against L-Bar with prejudice on the ground that under traditional
corporate successor law a corporation purchasing the assets of
another corporation does not become liable for the selling
corporation's debts. 6'
In a de novo review of the district court's grant of summary
judgement, the Ninth Circuit first identified the preliminary issue
as whether successor liability is recognized under CERCLA.
161
Recognizing that the language of the CERCLA statute fails to
address the crucial issue of corporate successor liability, the court
looked to the Third Circuit's interpretation case law to aid its
decision making process. 62
In Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.,1 63 the
Third Circuit recognized that the concerns which have led to a
successor corporation's common law liability for the torts of its
predecessor are equally applicable to determining responsibility for
cleanup costs under CERCLA. 1'4  Through an analogy to
successor corporate liability for ordinary torts and contractual
claims, the Smith Land court found that adoption of successor
158. Id.
159. Id. IMP processed and marketed smelter slag from the copper mill operated by Asarco.
Louisiana-Pacific, 29 Env't Rptr. Cas. (BNA) at 1451.
160. Louisiana-Pacific, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1453. In L-Bar's motion for summary
judgment defendants alleged that L-Bar was not the successor to IMP and could not be liable under
CERCLA for IMP's actions. Id. at 1450. District Judge Bryan found that there was not a significant
difference between federal law and Washington state law, and held that Washington law was
applicable in the case. Id. at 1452.
161. Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1262.
162. id. at 1262-63. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (1983 & Supp. 1991) (setting forth the language
of CERCLA); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd Cir. 1988),
cerm denied, 109 S.Ct. 837 (1988). CERCLA was hastily conceived and briefly debated and, as a
result, failed to address many important issues, including corporate successor liability. Id.
163. 851 F.2d 86 (1988).
164. Id. at 91. Under CERCLA, response liability is a remedial measure as opposed to a
punitive measure. Id. The primary aim of the remedial measure is to correct the hazardous condition.
Id.
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corporate liability in the context of the CERCLA statute is
consistent with the statutory law's purpose.1 65 The underlying
purpose of CERCLA, the court stated, was to take necessary steps
to protect the public by imposing liability on successor
corporations.1 Therefore, the cleanup costs for CERCLA sites
should be absorbed by the successor. 167 The court went on to
state that congressional intent supports the conclusion that the
successor should bear the cost.
168
In addition, the Third Circuit stated that the legislative history
indicates the congressional expectation that courts are to develop
federal common law to supplement the CERCLA statute. 169 The
Smith Land case indicated that the district court must consider
national uniformity when creating federal common law on
successor liability; otherwise the goals of CERCLA would be easily
evaded by a responsible party's choice to arrange a merger or
consolidation under the laws of particular states which unduly
restrict successor liability. 7 ' Because federal law is derived from
the general doctrines of states, it follows, then, that the general
doctrine of successor liability in operation in most states should
guide the court's decision.' Thus, the court found that Congress
did intend to impose successor liability on corporations which have
165. Id. at 91-92.
166. Id. at 92.
167. Id. Cleanup costs must be absorbed by someone, and these expenses can generally be
borne by two sources: (1) The entities that had a specific role in producing or maintaining the
hazardous condition; or (2) the taxpayers through federal funds. Id. at 91-92. It is clear that Congress
intended the burden to fall on the taxpayers only when the responsible parties lacked the means to
meet their obligations. Id.
168. Id. at 92.
169. Id. at 91. But see Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th
Cir. 1991) (stating it is not necessary to fashion a federal common law rule because Congress
intended to include a successor corporation when it used the word "corporation" in the CERCLA
statute).
170. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92.
171. Id. The excessively narrow statutes which apply in only a few states should not govern
the court's decision when determining successor liability under CERCLA. Id.
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either merged with or have consolidated with a corporation that is
responsible for clean-up costs under CERCLA. 72
The court in Louisiana-Pacific accepted the reasoning and
conclusions made in the Third Circuit, and stated that the analysis
set forth in Smith Land was equally applicable to successor liability
in the context of an asset sale.'73 The court thus held that the
traditional state rules of successor liability, as they blend to fashion
national uniformity and federal law, should govern the CERCLA
liability of successor corporations which acquire the assets of its
predecessor.' 74
Continuing in its analysis, the court considered whether the de
facto merger exception 175  to successor liability applied to the
facts of the case. 176 On this issue, the court concluded that the
District Court did not err in finding that the asset purchase was not
a de facto merger because there was no continuity of shareholders
following the sale.
177
The court next considered the continuing business enterprise
exception. 17  In holding that this exception was inapplicable, the
court reasoned that L-Bar did not have actual notice of IMP's
potential CERCLA liability. 79 At the time of the asset sale IMP
had not been identified as a potentially liable party by any state or
172. Id. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1991) (defining liable parties). See supra notes 30-
32 and accompanying text (explaining that successor liability is normally imposed where there has
been a merger or consolidation of two corporations).
173. Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1263.
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing the de facto merger exception
to traditional successor non-liability).
176. Louisiana Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1265-66. See Arnold Graphics Indus. v. Independent Agent
Center, Inc., 775 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that there must be continuity of stockholders in
order to find that a de facto merger has occurred); Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d
690, 693 (1st Cir. 1984) (one of the key requirements of the de facto merger doctrine is continuity
of shareholders). Since the court went on to consider the de facto merger doctrine, it appears that the
common law exceptions are still valid law in addition to the modem successor liability exceptions.
177. Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1266.
178. See supra notes 144-85 and accompanying text (discussing the modem continuing business
enterprise exception); supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing Turner, 397 Mich. 406,
244 N.W.2d 873, and the "continuing business enterprise" exception to successor non-liability); infra
notes 189-205 and accompanying text (explaining Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990) and
the "continuing business enterprise" exception to successor non-liability).
179. Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1265.
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federal agency, and no one had asserted or threatened a claim
against IMP for clean-up costs.18 Further, L-Bar did not continue
IMP's slag business.'81 Thus, the court found that the Louisiana-
Pacific case was distinguishable from cases in which the continuing
business enterprise exception was applicable, and therefore declined
to decide whether to adopt the continuing business enterprise
exception under CERCLA.8 2
The product-line exception was not presented by Asarco; thus,
the trial court did not consider the applicability of this exception to
CERCLA liability, 183 and the issue was not raised on appeal.'84
The Louisiana-Pacific court merely distinguished this case from
previous cases applying the "product-line" rule, rather than
denouncing the rule, because L-Bar did not continue IMP's
operations at the Asarco site. 85 Thus, it appears that the court
would have entertained the possibility of product-line approach to
successor liability if it had been presented by Asarco.
2. Specific Application of the Continuing Business Enterprise
Rule
Noting that the United States Supreme Court had used the
continuing business enterprise rule when considering successor
corporation liability in cases of labor disputes, 186 the District
180. Id. at 1265-66.
181. Id. at 1266. Actually, IMP had ceased its slag business nine months before L-Bar
purchased its assets. Id.
182. Id. at 1265. Since, L-Bar did not continue IMP's slag business, there was no continuing
business enterprise with respect to the portion of the business responsible for the hazardous waste.
Id. See Owner II, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 .F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1979)
(applying the continuing business enterprise exception to impose liability upon Owner II, a successor
corporation, under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136w
(1988), where Owner II had notice of outstanding debts to the EPA and where Owner II was
established to continue distributing pesticides as its predecessor had done).
183. Louisiana-Pacific, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1450, 1453.
184. See generally, Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
185. Louisiana-Pacific, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1450, 1453.
186. See generally, Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. N.LR.B., 482 U.S. 27 (1987);
Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB,
414 U.S. 168 (1973).
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Court in United States v. Distler8 7 stated, without further
explanation, that the reasons supporting the application of the
continuing business enterprise rule in products liability cases were
equally applicable in cases involving the liability of a successor
corporation for response costs under section 107 of CERCLA1 88
In United States v. Distler, Angell I (referred to as "Angex"
by the court) was formed in 1976 to purchase the Angell
Manufacturing Division of the Lamson & Sessions
Corporation." 9 This division primarily manufactured metallic
name plates for producers of consumer electronic products."'
Angell I continued operating the name plate business, and did little
to improve it or change the focus of the product line.1 9' In 1979
three key employees of Angell I decided to purchase the company
and operate it themselves, forming the Ang Corporation."~ Each
of the three held one-third of Ang's stock, but none of them had
owned any Angell I stock.193 Shortly after Ang was formed, it
entered into an asset purchase agreement by which it acquired
substantially all of the assets of Angell I, including the equipment,
inventory, and physical plants."9 The agreement specified that
Ang (subsequently Angell Manufacturing Corporation or Angell I)
assumed only certain liabilities set forth in the contract.' 5 Angell
I then dissolved and Ang changed its name to Angell
Manufacturing Corporation (Angell I).196 None of Angel I's
shareholders or directors became shareholders or directors of
Angell 11. 19 7 Following the transfer, the new company issued a
formal announcement of the change of ownership on Angell
187. 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
138. Id. at 643. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (1983 & Supp. 1991) (setting forth CERCLA liability
provisions).
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letterhead. 9  With the exception of three managers, the
corporation retained the same employees, continued to produce the
same products, served the same customers, and held itself out to
the public as the same company.199
The predecessor, Angell I had contracted to have hazardous
substances transported to certain sites for disposal, and the
government instituted an action against the Angell Manufacturing
Corporation for response costs incurred in cleaning up those
hazardous waste sites.2" The District Court denied Angell H's
motion to dismiss, stating that a valid claim had been asserted
against Angell II as a successor corporation." 1
The court in Distler, relying on Ray v. Alad Corp., concluded
that the technical differences between a sale of assets, a merger,
and a consolidation are irrelevant. 2 In applying the continuing
business enterprise rule, the court in Distler found that the
purchaser retained essentially the same employees and management
as did its predecessor, the company operated out of the same
physical facilities and produced the same product line after the
transfer of ownership, and the company held itself out to the public
as the same company, retaining the same operating assets and
succeeding to all liabilities necessary for the orderly transition of
ownership.20 3 In light of these facts, the court reasoned that if the
purchaser was permitted to avoid liability, it would be a "victory
of form over substance" and would be contrary to the
congressional intent that producers of hazardous substances be held
liable for improper disposal of those substances under
CERCLA.2"' Although the company served a different market at
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 638.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 643. The technical differences between a sale of assets, merger, consolidation, or
any other way in which ownership could have been transferred were irrelevant because the issue was
one of CERCLA law. Id. This issue was whether, under CERCLA, a manufacturer's responsibility
for its hazardous waste survived a change in ownership where the business retains its identity and
the successor continues to operate in the same manner and in the same place. Id. See Ray v. Alad
Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 855, 127 Cal. Rptr. 817, 821 (1977).
203. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 643.
204. Id.
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the time of the trial, the change in production responding to
evolving market conditions did not change the fact that at the time
of the transfer, the predecessor and purchaser were virtually
identical, and that under those circumstances, the purchaser, Angell
II, succeeded to CERCLA liability. 5
Courts have consistently held that Congress did intend
successor liability under CERCLA.2" Further, the issue of
successor liability under CERCLA is governed by federal law, and
the courts must look to other circuits and states in fashioning the
law so as to achieve national uniformity.2" However, it has
proven to be virtually impossible to formulate a uniform approach
to successor liability under CERCLA in light of the divergent
views of many jurisdictions and the EPA.
IV. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has, like many
courts, taken an expansive approach to successor liability under
CERCLA. The EPA's policy is to hold successor corporations
liable for the acts of its predecessor if the successor acquires the
assets of the predecessor and also continues the business operations
of the predecessor in substantially the same manner.2" The
EPA's policy, then, applies the product-line rule in the CERCLA
context. However, some courts have apparently been less than
eager to follow the lead of the EPA. 9
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3rd Cir.
1988); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9h Cir. 1990); United States v.
Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990); United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc., 751 F.
Supp. 902 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
207. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92.
208. EPA Memorandum, Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor Corporations for
Abandoned Sites Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and LiabilityAct
(CERCLA), Courtney M. Price, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring
(June 13, 1984). See generally, Comment, EPA's Policy of Corporate Successor Liability Under
CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENV'T. LJ. 78 (1986-87) (discussing the EPA's policy on corporate successor
liability and concluding that expansion of corporate successor liability is unjustified).
209. See supra notes 53-90 and accompanying text (discussing the viability of the product-line
rule as applied in the CERCLA context).
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At the present time, the future of successor liability under
CERCLA in the Ninth Circuit remains uncertain, and it appears
only that three judges in the Ninth Circuit have elected to take a
relatively conservative approach to CERCLA successor liability by
failing to directly decide the issue. In declining to decide which
exception to adopt, however, the three-judge panel left the door
open to the application of the two modem and expansive successor
liability theories.
210
However, the problems associated with determining which rules
should apply to successor liability under CERCLA have not been
isolated to the Ninth Circuit. Various courts have interpreted
CERCLA differently; some acknowledge that the "product-line"
rule is applicable,21' and others have specifically chosen to apply
the "continuing business enterprise" rule.212  Still others
acknowledge that both the "product-line" and "continuing
business enterprise" theories are viable, but not needed to find
successor liability under CERCLA
Since the product-line rule represents a radical departure from
the traditional corporate successor liability rules,214 many states
have been unwilling to accept it even in the context of strict tort
210. The Ninth Circuit found that Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d 1260, was distinguishable from
cases in which the continuing business enterprise exception was applicable because L-Bar did not
have actual notice of IMP's potential CERCLA liability and because L-Bar did not continue IMP's
slag business. See supra notes 144-62 and accompanying text (discussing Louisiana-Pacific).
. 211. See United States v. Western Processing Co. Inc., 751 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Wash 1990);
supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc.
and the applicability of the product-line rule to CERCLA). See also Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745
F.2d 1217, 1219 (1984) (limiting the product-line rule to situations where the plaintiff's remedies
against the original manufacturer are destroyed by the successor's acquisition of the business; the
successor can assume the risk-spreading ability; and requiring the successor to assume responsibility
for defective products is fair in light of the good will being enjoyed by the successor in the continued
operation of the business). But see, In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010,
1014 n.5 (D. Mass. 1989) (noting the First Circuit has refused to find that the product-line rule has
any vitality under Massachusetts law); Florom v. Elliott Manufacturing, 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir.
1989) (pronouncing that Colorado rejects both the product-line and continuing business enterprise
rules as viable successor liability theories).
212. See Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990); supra notes 187-205 and accompanying
text (discussing United States v. Distler and the applicability of the product-line rule to CERCLA).
213. See Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991).
214. See supra notes 53-90 and accompanying text (discussing the formulation of the product-
line rule).
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liability.215 However, if the true intent of Congress in formulating
CERCLA was to place the burden of clean-up costs on the
government only when the responsible parties lacked the ability to
meet their obligations, 216 it rationally follows that the product-line
rule should be uniformly applied throughout the nation in the
CERCLA context.2 17 The government's remedies against the
predecessor are destroyed by the successor's acquisition of the
business because the predecessor ceases to exist, and the successor
is able to assume the risk-spreading capabilities of the
predecessor.2"' Under these circumstances, it is fair to require the
successor to assume responsibility in light of the continued
operation of the business and transferred good-will.219 In this
context, the product-line rule will accentuate congressional intent.
Despite this rationale, the application of the product-line rule and
the continuing business enterprise rule within a CERCLA context
continues to be unclear.
The same rationale can be applied when considering the
application of the continuing business enterprise rule in the
CERCLA context. Further, because the continuing business
enterprise rule is considered a less radical departure from common
law rules, it is more widely accepted than the product-line rule in
CERCLA cases. The continuing business enterprise rule will also
facilitate the Congressional objectives, although it will not result in
the implication of successor liability in every case where the
successor corporation might conceivably be liable. Thus, in order
215. See, e.g., Florom v. Elliott Manufacturing, 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989) (explaining that
Colorado rejects both the product-line and the continuing business enterprise rules in the context of
strict tort liability); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 n.5 (D.
Mass 1989) (noting that the First Circuit does not recognize that the product-line rule has any vitality
under Massachusetts law); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 713 F. Supp. 1491,1495 n.5
(S.D. Ohio 1988) (expressing that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the
product-line rule is accepted law in Pennsylvania).
216. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3rd Cit. 1988).
217. But see Comment, supra note 21, at 100 (stating that the EPA is not without a remedy
due to the corporate transfer of assets because CERCLA specifically provides for a fund to cover
situations where there are not liable parties under the Act or where reimburseinent from liable parties
is inadequate).
218.: Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1984).
219. Id.
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to satisfy congressional intent to the greatest extent, both the
product-line and the continuing business enterprise rule or an
alternative must necessarily be applied. One such alternative was
formulated in the 1991 case of Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.20
In Anspec the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit noted that Congress had provided a list of parties
potentially liable for cleanup costs of hazardous waste sites and
that corporate successors were not expressly included in any of the
categories.22 Despite this finding, the Anspec court concluded
that Congress intended to include successor corporations within the
description of entities that are potentially liable under CERCLA
when it used the term "corporation.
' 22
To reach this conclusion, the court reasoned that there is
generally a presumption that Congress deliberately omitted a
remedy from a statute that contains a comprehensive legislative
scheme including an integrated system of procedures for
enforcement.223 However, this presumption does not apply when
a court merely interprets a word used in a statute to include one of
its commonly accepted components.' 4 In the context of this
problem, there is a universal rule that "corporation" includes a
successor corporation resulting from a merger.2' Thus, a
successor corporation is liable for response costs under CERCLA
by the very provisions of the Act.
226
While most jurisdictions agree that Congress intended to
provide for the effective response to hazardous waste sites, and that
the costs of such responses be borne by those responsible for
220. 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991).
221. Id. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1991) (providing that covered persons include the
owner and operator of a vessel or facility; any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated by any facility at which the hazardous substances were disposed of; any
person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous
substances; and any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities).
222. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1245.
223. Id. at 1246.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1247.
226. Id.
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disposal of chemical poisons, the results of cases involving
successor liability under CERCLA are inconsistent. Such
inconsistencies may lead to "forum shopping" in the sense that if
there is even a remote possibility of CERCLA liability, corporate
sales will take place only in those jurisdictions which treat
successors most favorably. These jurisdictions will typically be
those which do not accept either the "product-line" or "continuing
business enterprise" rules and those which find no ambiguity in the
cleanup liability provision of CERCLA.
CONCLUSION
Many commentators who are familiar with the Superfund law
(CERCLA) say that it was doomed to failure from its inception,
largely because of fundamental flaws in the legislation that created
it.227 In light of the confusion and the inconsistencies surrounding
successor liability under CERCLA, the ground is set for some
clarification. This action may occur either by the Supreme Court
granting certiorari to resolve the issue, or by Congress amending
the language itself. It is this commentator's opinion that such
clarification should be borne by the Legislature.
The Supreme Court should not resolve the issue, because in
doing so, the Supreme Court would be required either to impose
the more modem corporate successor liability theories upon all
states or to reject the viability of those rules. The hesitancy to take
such action stems from the general principle that it is within each
state's sovereignty to create its own statutory and judicial rules of
corporate law.
Further, the Supreme Court is unlikely to interpret the meaning
and intent of Congress in light of the comprehensive legislative
scheme of CERCLA. If the Supreme Court were to do so, it would
be acting as a "superlegislature," a stance it has historically been
reluctant to take. Thus, the final, and only viable solution to the
problem of whether a successor corporation may be held liable for
227. Frank Viviano, Billions Spent On Legal Fees; Cleanup Lags, L.A. DAILY JoURNAL, Juno
3, 1991, § 11, at 1, col. 1.
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the acts of its predecessor under CERCLA is for Congress to
amend the list of parties potentially liable for cleanup costs to
reflect its true intent. Congress is the body best suited to determine,
through investigation and debate, which groups have contributed to
the hazardous waste problem.228 Congress can study the societal
and economic impacts that would result from the imposition of
successor liability on additional parties, therefore Congress should
be the body to address the changes to categories of potentially
responsible parties under CERCLA.229
As previously stated, the problems associated with hazardous
waste sites are nationwide. These problems are rapidly becoming
a crisis rather than a mere problem.23 Because the meager
history of CERCLA does disclose that the Act was intended to
provide for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites nationwide, a
uniform national policy should be provided so that the impending
crisis may be swiftly and effectively limited. In the absence of
successor liability, the government may find that it is left without
any practical recourse against polluters where the predecessor
corporation has long since disappeared and its shareholders are
difficult if not impossible to locate should they be personally
liable."' Congress should amend the language of CERCLA to
expressly provide that successor corporations be held liable for the
negligent or careless acts of its predecessor in disposing of
hazardous substances. However, in light of President Bush's
relationship with the manufacturing sector of this country, it is
unlikely that he would sign such expansive legislation.
228. Comment, supra note 21, at 102. Courts do not have the resources to conduct the
necessary investigation, debate and analysis to determine which parties should bear liability under
CERCLA. Id.
229. Id.
230. Initially, the Superfund's legislative sponsors estimated that the cleanup would be
accomplished in a single five-year program and would cost less than $5 billion. Frank Viviano, supra
note 227 § II at 1, col. 1. Today, analysts predict that the program could take up to half a century
to complete and cost as much as $I trillion in industry and federal spending. Id. See, Semararo,
Toward an Optimal System of Successor Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 6 STAN. ENV'T. LJ.
227 (1986-87).
231. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (D. Mass. 1989).
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If Congress is serious about taking remedial actions regarding
hazardous waste sites, amendments to the Superfund law are
essential. If current projections of Superfund-related expenses are
on point, the cost will be a minimum of $2,000 for each American
citizen."' This cost will most likely be reflected in price
increases passed along to consumers on numerous chemical and
petroleum-based products.233 Some analysts and commentators
believe that an extensive government bailout will eventually be
needed to finish the toxic cleanup and to provide emergency
backing for commercial insurance companies which are burdened
with extensive Superfund-related liability.
2 34
It appears, then, that in this era of tax adversity, the only option
which may be available to Congress may be to impose just such a
tax upon all individuals, the funds of which would be applied to
the cleaning up of the environment. If the environment is to be
cleaned up for future generations, this tax would have the same
effect upon citizens as would successor corporations' risk-spreading
actions of passing on the costs to consumers, and may prove to be




232. Frank Viviano, supra note 227, § H, at 1, col. 1.
233. Id.
234. Id. Of course, the government bailout would be at direct taxpayer expense. Id.
